For the radical behaviorist biological events are not biological and public events are not public by Barnes-Holmes, Dermot
For the Radical Behaviorist Biological Events Are Not Biological and Public Events Are 
Not Public  
Author(s): Dermot Barnes-Holmes 
Source: Behavior and Philosophy , 2003, Vol. 31 (2003), pp. 145-150  




Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/27759452?seq=1&cid=pdf-
reference#references_tab_contents 
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide 
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and 
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. 
 
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at 
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies (CCBS)  is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, 
preserve and extend access to Behavior and Philosophy
This content downloaded from 
              78.18.64.56 on Mon, 04 Oct 2021 12:18:37 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Behavior and Philosophy, SI, 145-150 (2003). ? 2003 Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies
 For the Radical Behaviorist Biological Events are
 not biological and public events are not public
 Dermot Barnes-Holmes
 National University of Ireland, Maynooth
 I should declare at the outset that Dr. Moore is one my intellectual heroes. In
 fact, I recall well that it was only after reading his 1981 article, On Mentalism,
 Methodological Behaviorism, and Radical Behaviorism, that I became fully
 convinced of the value and importance of the philosophy of radical behaviorism
 and the science of behavior analysis. Not surprisingly, therefore, I find myself in
 broad agreement with his argument that a firm distinction should be made between
 radical behaviorism and what he labels logical behaviorism and conceptual
 analysis. Unlike these latter two intellectual traditions, the radical behaviorist does
 not assume that mentalistic terms must refer to events that are publicly observable,
 such as underlying physiological states, publicly observable behavior, or
 dispositions to engage in publicly observable behavior. Rather, the radical
 behaviorist approaches mentalistic terms in the same way as any other verbal
 behavior?by focusing on the behavioral history and current conditions that give
 rise to the use of such terms within the verbal community, including the scientific
 community itself. From this perspective, therefore, the use of a mental term (i.e., a
 verbal response) may be under the control of public or private stimuli, and the role
 of the radical behaviorist is to analyze the historical and current behavioral
 contingencies that establish such verbal control. Only in so doing will the use of
 mental terms be understood from within the world-view of radical behaviorism.
 Although I find myself in general agreement with Moore's thesis, I would like
 to elaborate upon two of the key issues that arose in his article: (1) the role of
 physiological events in behavior analysis, and (2) the concept of the private event
 in radical behaviorism. In the first case, Moore discusses the problems inherent in
 treating private events as purely physiological, and I certainly agree with the points
 he makes in this regard. However, I think it should also be emphasized that the
 study of physiological events, per se, needs to be incorporated into the
 experimental analysis of behavior, not as underlying or explanatory mechanisms
 but as behavioral events in and of themselves. In the second case, Moore points
 out, "... the distinction between public and private events in behavior analysis is
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 at heart not an ontological distinction between physical and mental. Rather, it is a
 distinction of access" (p. 177). I think this is a fundamentally important argument
 because it highlights the nonrealist and intensely pragmatic approach to
 psychology that both radical behaviorism and behavior analysis embody. In what
 follows, I will elaborate on each of these two issues, and in so doing will further
 bolster, I hope, Moore's thesis that radical behaviorism is fundamentally different
 from the other behaviorisms that he discusses.
 The Role of Physiological Events in Behavior Analysis
 Some behavioral researchers may be seduced into thinking that the
 physiologists and neuroscientists of the future will in due course make our
 behavioral science more complete. The temporal gaps between stimulus and
 response, for example, need to be filled with physiological events, and to do this
 we should simply pass the baton of behavioral research on to the physiologist and
 neuroscientist. Indeed, Skinner (1974) seemed to suggest this very strategy:
 The physiologist of the future will tell us all that can be known about what is
 happening inside the behaving organism. His account will be an important
 advance over a behavioral analysis, because the latter is necessarily
 "historical"?that is to say, it is confined to functional relations showing
 temporal gaps. Something is done today which affects the behavior of an
 organism tomorrow. No matter how clearly that fact can be established, a step is
 missing, and we must wait for the physiologist to supply it. He will be able to
 show how an organism is changed when exposed to contingencies of
 reinforcement and why the changed organism then behaves in a different way,
 possibly at a much later date. What he discovers cannot invalidate the laws of a
 science of behavior, but it will make the picture of human action more nearly
 complete, (p. 215)
 Skinner's quotation could be taken to mean that behavior analysts must wait
 patiently for neuroscientists to provide us with the answers we need, and these will
 fit perfectly and immediately into our hitherto incomplete behavioral puzzle. I am
 fairly sure, however, that this is not what Skinner really intended. Instead, I suspect
 that he was suggesting that certain questions about behavior will require the
 knowledge, technology, and experimental procedures of the physiologist and
 neuroscientist, but behavior analysts will still need to undertake the appropriate
 behavior-analytic research in order to advance behavioral science qua behavioral
 science. In other words, physiological events may be incorporated into the science
 of behavior, not as biochemical events per se, but as behavioral events. Skinner's
 later work, cited by Moore on page 171, indicates that he certainly seemed
 comfortable with this notion when he wrote: "I see no reason why we should not
 also call the action of efferent nerves behavior if no muscular response is needed
 for reinforcement" (Skinner in Catania & Harnard, 1988, p. 485).
 In any case, I believe that behavior analysts should study physiological events
 as behavioral events (Barnes-Holmes, 2000). After all, it is only a matter of
 convenience that lever pressing, key pecking, and button pushing have most often
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 been used as responses within behavior-analytic research. Thus, for example, a
 behavioral researcher could quite legitimately measure dopamine levels, as a class
 of responses, contingent on food delivery. In so doing, dopamine levels are not
 being analyzed at the biological or chemical level, but at the behavioral level (i.e.,
 as a response class contingent on specific consequences). When approached from
 this angle, biological events are not treated as underlying, mediating, or
 modulating behavioral events. Rather, biological events are approached, measured,
 analyzed, and understood as part of the behavioral system under investigation, and
 thus they are seen as participating in functional relations with past and current
 behavioral contingencies.
 A recent pilot study conducted in my own laboratory provides a relevant
 example of this approach. In this study, brain activity was recorded in the form of
 event related potentials (ERPs), while adult participants were exposed to
 respondent-type training and testing in equivalence relations across multiple
 stimulus sets (see Barnes, Leader, & Smeets, 1996). The study focused on the level
 of brain activity that occurred during each participant's first exposure to pairs of
 nonequivalent stimuli (see DiFiore, Dube, Oross, Wilkinson, Deutsch, &
 Mcllvane, 2000). The data thus far indicate that the level of a particular measure of
 brain activity, known as the N400 waveform, decreases across successive stimulus
 sets, indicating a functional relation between this waveform and number of training
 and test exposures. When approached in this way, the brain activity is not seen as
 underlying, mediating, or modulating the subject's test performance. Instead, the
 N400 waveforms constitute a response class that participates in the behavioral
 contingencies that are established and manipulated within the experiment. Of
 course, there may be many additional functional relations between brain activity
 and other more "overt" responses, such as key presses, but these relations may be
 viewed as behavior-behavior relations (Barnes-Holmes, 2000), which have limited
 explanatory value for the radical behaviorist (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). In any
 case, this general approach to the study of brain activity clearly separates radical
 behaviorism from the other behaviorisms discussed by Moore.
 The Concept of the Private Event in Radical Behaviorism
 The distinction between public and private events is a popular one in radical
 behaviorism. Paradoxically, however, all behavioral events from a radical
 behavioral perspective may be defined as private, and the implications of this view
 again serve to highlight the unique nature of radical behaviorism as a philosophy
 of science.
 Consider an experimental participant who has been exposed to an operant
 contingency in the presence of a green light. If the presence of the green light now
 occasions a higher response rate than occurs in its absence, the light may be
 functioning as a discriminative stimulus. At this point, we might be tempted to
 argue that the discriminative stimulus is a public event, because both the subject
 and the experimenter (and anyone else who can perceive a green light) can observe
 the events in question. To draw this conclusion, however, involves confounding
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 common sense terms with the scientific nomenclature of behavior analysis. In the
 former case, anyone who perceives the green light is observing the same green
 light, but in the latter case no two individuals ever respond to the same
 discriminative stimulus. Any given discriminative stimulus acquires its behavioral
 properties within the behavioral history and current context of a particular
 organism. And because no two behavioral histories are exactly identical, no two
 discriminative stimuli can be defined, at least technically, as the same. Even when
 an experimenter attempts to provide similar histories of reinforcement in the
 presence of the "same" green light for two organisms, the discriminative properties
 that are established for the green light will not be exactly identical for both
 organisms (e.g., slightly different response rates or extinction curves may be
 observed across the behavioral streams). In this sense, therefore, no two organisms
 ever respond to, observe, or share the same discriminative stimulus, and thus all
 stimulus events in behavior analysis are "private" to the behavioral stream within
 which they occur (see Barnes & Roche, 1997; Barnes-Holmes, 2000, for detailed
 discussions of this issue).
 At this point, it might be argued that the private or public nature of
 discriminative stimuli for our experimental participants is not at issue in the current
 context?what matters is that two or more behavioral scientists can readily observe
 the events in question and agree about what they saw (e.g., that the green light is
 apparently functioning as a discriminative stimulus). For the radical behaviorist,
 however, the research activity of the scientist, including both scientific observation
 and agreement, are no less behavioral than any other activity (Skinner, 1974; see
 also Barnes & Roche, 1997). When two scientists observe and agree about the
 same event, the observation and subsequent agreement that each of them
 discriminates are, from the radical behaviorist perspective, stimulus events that
 participate in the separate behavioral streams of the two scientists. In this sense,
 therefore, even scientific observation and agreement are private to the behavioral
 streams within which they occur. Not even the behavioral scientist can escape his
 or her own behavioral stream and make direct nonbehavioral contact with an
 ontological reality about which he or she can then agree or disagree with another
 scientist. Skinner described the reflexive nature of radical behaviorism in this way:
 It would be absurd for the behaviorist to contend that he is in any way exempt
 from his analysis. He cannot step outside of the causal stream and observe
 behavior from some special point of vantage, "perched on the epicycle of
 Mercury." In the very act of analyzing human behavior he is behaving. (1974, p.
 234)
 On balance, stating that radical behaviorism is inherently reflexive also may
 be defined as a behavioral event, and thus any ontological claims with regard to its
 reflexivity can be seen as contradicting its own reflexivity. A radical behaviorist
 who claims that everything he or she says is a behavioral event, and then goes on
 to state that this very claim is true, in some ontological or nonbehavioral sense, can
 expect to be challenged vigorously by other members of the wider verbal
 community. It would be a mistake, therefore, to become overly dogmatic about the
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 reflexive nature of radical behaviorist philosophy. In doing so, one paradoxically
 undermines the very reflexivity that one is seeking to uphold. A radical behaviorist
 solution to this conundrum involves embracing what I have called behavioral
 pragmatism, an intensely personal, goal-driven, and pragmatic approach to science
 and philosophy (Barnes-Holmes, 2000; see also Barnes & Roche, 1997). The
 details of behavioral pragmatism are not important here?what matters, is that
 radical behaviorism is seemingly characterized by an extreme form of pragmatism
 within which no final, absolute, or ontological claims are permitted, lest they
 undermine the behavioral nature of radical behaviorism itself.
 The intense pragmatism of radical behaviorism is also to be found in Moore's
 claim that the distinction between public and private events is not ontological but
 is derived from a (pragmatic) concern with ease of access to the events in question.
 For the radical behaviorist, therefore, public events are not really public and
 private events are not really private. Indeed, as I have just shown, a radical
 behaviorist argument may be mounted that all behavioral events, in one sense, are
 private, but on balance when we hold on too tightly to this argument the argument
 itself is undermined. For the radical behaviorist, therefore, any distinction that is
 made between or among types of behavioral events should not be ontological in a
 final or absolute sense. Rather, any verbal distinction should be assessed relative to
 the use that distinction has in helping the researcher to achieve specific analytic
 goals. Sometimes the distinction might be useful in this regard, and sometimes it
 may not.
 Conclusion
 The radical behaviorist approach to biological and private events clearly
 differentiates it from logical behaviorism and conceptual analysis as discussed by
 Moore. Unlike radical behaviorism, the latter traditions are both focused on
 identifying the publicly observable, ontological referents for specific psychological
 terms, and thus they are underpinned by an implicit and often explicit realist
 philosophy. From this perspective, the science is driven not by the personal
 analytic goals of the scientist but by the assumption that scientific activity will
 eventually reveal the true nature of reality. Pragmatic strategies may sometimes be
 used within these latter traditions, but upon close inspection they are often firmly
 based on realist assumptions (Hayes, 1992). In short, radical behaviorism is a
 ontological and intensely pragmatic, whereas the latter behaviorisms are intensely
 ontological and a-pragmatic.
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